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Abstract: The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has long been suspected of creating a 
free rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations.  To address this issue, we model 
multilateral negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation.  
We show that an optimal mechanism induces only the largest exporters to participate in 
negotiations over any product, thus providing a rationalization for the Principal supplier 
rule.  We also show that, through this channel, equilibrium tariffs vary according to the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of export shares:  higher concentration in a sector reduces 
free riding and thus causes a lower tariff.  Estimation of our model using sector-level 
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I.  Introduction 
The Most-Favored Nation (MFN) clause has been a central element of 
international trade agreements for over a hundred years
1 and is widely acknowledged as 
one of the “pillars” of the GATT/WTO system.  Found in almost all WTO agreements, 
the MFN clause requires that each member give equal treatment to the goods or services 
of all other members in the application of its trade policy. In practice, MFN implies that 
every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it must do so for the 
same goods or services from all its WTO trading partners.  Despite the prominence of 
MFN, its actual effect on the progress of trade liberalization within the multilateral 
system remains largely unknown. 
A spate of recent theoretical literature has pointed to several potential benefits of 
the MFN clause, deriving mainly from its ability to curb opportunistic behavior by 
governments that might otherwise undermine trade agreements.
2  This paper does not 
address these arguments; rather, we focus on the most notable and long-standing concern 
about MFN, which is that it opens the possibility of countries “free riding” on the trade 
negotiations of others.  This concern stems from the fact that whenever a few WTO 
members mutually exchange trade-barrier reductions, they must extend those reductions 
to all other WTO members under MFN, even if the latter do not reciprocate.  To the 
extent that non-reciprocating countries benefit from improved market access to 
liberalizing countries (the so-called MFN externality), two related incentive problems 
emerge:  countries may avoid entering into negotiations in hopes of free riding on the 
                                                 
1 See Caplin and Krishna (1988) for a detailed history of MFN.  
2 Examples include, Choi (1995), Either (2004), Ludema and Cebi (2002), Bagwell and Staiger (2002, 
Ch.5), Ederington and McCalman (2003), Saggi (2003); see Horn and Mavroidis (2001) for a survey.   2
liberalization of others; and countries that do enter negotiations may reach inefficient 
agreements, as they do not fully internalize the benefits of their liberalization.   
The purpose of this paper is to assess the empirical relevance of the MFN free 
rider problem.  We argue that free riding arises out of two basic constraints (besides MFN 
itself): countries are free to choose whether or not to participate in trade negotiations on 
any given product; and participants cannot precommit to punishing free riders.  We show 
that any system of trade negotiations that is optimal (i.e., maximizes world welfare) 
subject to these constraints induces the participation of only a subset of countries: the 
importer (there is only one in our model) and the largest exporters of each product.  This 
accords with the WTO negotiating convention known as the principal supplier rule.  The 
model also allows us to establish a negative relationship between exporter concentration, 
as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) of export shares, and the 
importer’s tariff, on a good-by-good basis.  We derive an estimating equation similar to 
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), suitable for 
explaining cross-sector trade protection. Using US MFN tariff rates for both 1983 and 
1989-1999, we find evidence of a significant free-rider effect. 
 
II.  Assessing the MFN Free-Rider Argument 
Although policymakers have been concerned about the MFN free rider problem 
for centuries,
3 Johnson (1965) was the first to model the effect of free riders on bilateral 
                                                 
3 Viner (1924) cites John Jay, who in a 1787 report to Congress concerning the U.S.-Netherlands Treaty of 
1782, expressed the U.S. position on MFN: “it would certainly be inconsistent with the most obvious 
principles of justice and fair construction, that because France purchases, at a great price, a privilege of the 
United States, that therefore the Dutch shall immediately insist, not on having the like privileges for the like 
price, but without any price at all.” The U.S. would not fully embrace unconditional MFN in trade treaties 
until 1923.   3
reciprocal tariff reductions under MFN.  Caplin and Krishna (1988) extended the result to 
a formal bargaining model, in which pairs of countries simultaneously negotiate bilateral 
agreements (subject to MFN).  The result is that each pair chooses inefficiently high 
tariffs, due to the MFN externality.  In both of these papers, the authors assume a setting 
in which the MFN externality exists and negotiations take place on a bilateral basis.  
Others have cast doubt on these assumptions.  Viner (1931) noted that countries 
often try to minimize the MFN externality by defining products so narrowly as to make 
MFN nonbinding.
4  In the extreme, if products are defined in such a way that no product 
is imported from more than one country, then the MFN externality cannot exist.  In 
practice, manipulation of product classification is limited under the harmonized 
classification system, and we know from the data that the vast majority of imported 
products into the U.S. are supplied by more than one country at the relevant level of 
aggregation. Nevertheless, it remains an open question how effective creative product 
definition has been in limiting the MFN externality.  
More recently, Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch.5) have argued that the MFN 
externality can be suppressed by reciprocity, defined as bilateral liberalization (subject to 
MFN) aimed at holding constant world relative prices.  To see this point, consider the 
pattern of trade depicted in figure 1(a), involving three countries, A, B and C, and two 
goods, 1, and 2.  If country A lowers its tariff on imports of good 1 on an MFN basis, it 
improves the terms of trade of both B and C.  If B cuts its tariff on good 2 in exchange, it 
worsens the terms of trade of C, thereby mitigating the MFN externality.  However, if we 
                                                 
4 The oft-cited example is the German-Swiss treaty of 1904 in which tariffs were reduced on “large dapple 
mountain cattle or brown cattle reared at a spot at least 300 metres above sea level and having at least one 
month’s grazing each year at a spot at least 800 metres above sea level” (Viner, 1931 p. 101, as quoted in 
Caplin and Krishna, 1988, p269.)    4
consider the alternative pattern of trade with three goods, depicted in figure 1(b), bilateral 
exchange of tariff concessions does not suppress the MFN externality.  The effect of A’s 
tariff cut is the same as in 1(a), but now B’s tariff cut improves C’s terms of trade as well, 
thereby magnifying the MFN externality.  
 Figure 1(b) actually says less about the pattern of trade per se than it does about 
the set of trade policy instruments available to affect reciprocity.  If instead of cutting its 
tariff on good 2, B subsidizes its exports of good 1, the suppression result goes through.  
Thus, whether or not the MFN externality can be controlled through reciprocity depends 
on having the requisite policy instruments available to hold constant the outsider’s terms 
of trade.  In actual practice, the GATT bans export subsidies in general, as well as many 
other trade policies.  In light of such restrictions, it remains an open question how 
effective reciprocity has been in limiting the MFN externality. 
Finally, there is reason to question whether countries actually do free ride. Much 
of the literature takes free riding, i.e., the existence of countries that do not participate in 
the tariff cutting exercise, as exogenous. However, Ludema (1991) put forth a model of 
multilateral bargaining, in which countries have the option of free riding but choose not 
to do so in equilibrium. This occurs because free riding by one country triggers a 











Figure 1(a)  Figure 1(b)   5
riders.  Thus, in this model, the structure of the multilateral negotiations causes the MFN 
externality to be internalized. 
Recent theoretical literature on the effect of MFN on multi-country bargaining has 
focused on sequential bilateral bargaining (Bagwell and Staiger, 2003; Bond, Ching, and 
Lai, 2000) and asymmetric information (McCalman, 2002; Ludema and Cebi, 2002).  In 
each case, the MFN externality continues to exert an effect, though not always in the 
form of free riding.
5 
As an empirical matter there is ample evidence that not all countries fully 
participate in trade negotiations on all goods, even during multilateral negotiating 
rounds.
6  Finger (1979) provides evidence that this lack of participation affected US tariff 
concessions in the first six GATT rounds (1947-1967).  He found that the share of 
imports originating in participating countries of goods on which the US granted tariff cuts 
was consistently larger than those countries’ share in total US imports.  His interpretation 
is that US selected goods for tariff cuts so as to internalize the benefits to the participants.  
Examining a cross-section of U.S. pre-Tokyo tariffs, Lavergne (1983) finds higher tariffs 
on goods exported predominantly by LDCs, controlling for various domestic political 
factors.  He offers an MFN interpretation of this finding as well.  
In summary, the theory of trade negotiations under MFN is inconclusive about the 
importance of free riding, and the empirical evidence is thin.  Our purpose in this paper is 
                                                 
5 In Bagwell and Staiger (2003), for example, countries negotiating early in a sequence hold back on 
liberalization to prevent free riding on the negotiations by countries later in the sequence (“forward 
manipulation”), but later negotiators also steal some of the benefits of early negotiations (“backward 
stealing”). In McCalman (2002), the MFN externality raises the cost to a large country of inducing 
privately-informed small countries to join an agreement, resulting in inefficient outcomes. 
6 Horn and Mavroidis (2000) note that “...In the WTO, negotiations for the most part take place between 
subsets of Member countries. Sometimes this is ‘officially sanctioned,’ as in the case of Principal Supplier 
negotiations. But also in seemingly multilateral negotiations, the ‘actual’ negotiations occur between a very 
limited number of countries...” (Horn and Mavroidis, 2000, p. 34). 
   6
to provide what is sorely lacking in this literature: an empirical assessment based on 
theory.  In section III, we construct a model of MFN free riding.  We assume a set-up in 
which the MFN externality exists, meaning that free riders do stand to benefit from the 
tariff reductions of others.  We also assume a negotiating set-up in which countries have 
the option to free ride, but participants have only limited ability to punish free riders.  In 
particular, we impose two constraints on the negotiations: 1) voluntary participation – no 
country can be compelled to “pay” for a tariff concession made by another; 2) Pareto 
efficiency for participants – the bargaining that takes place among participants is 
efficient.  These constraints are equivalent to those used by Dixit and Olsen (2000) to 
study free riding in the provision of public goods.  
Beyond these constraints, we attempt to remain as general as possible in modeling 
the interactions between countries.  Thus, we treat the allocation of gains from the 
multilateral trade negotiations as a mechanism design problem.  We define an optimal 
mechanism to be one that maximizes world payoffs (participants and free riders), subject 
to these constraints.  
In Section III.A, we derive the tariff that is Pareto efficient for participants. We 
find this tariff depends on the usual political and economic characteristics of the industry 
(e.g., see Grossman and Helpman, 1995) and is a decreasing function of the market share 
of participants. Section III.B considers the participation decision itself. We find that, in 
general, not all countries can be induced to participate. Full participation (i.e., no free 
riding) can only occur when the degree of exporter concentration, as measured by a HHI 
of export market shares, is sufficiently high.    7
Section III.C discusses the relationship between the optimal mechanisms and the 
principal supplier rule.  The principal supplier rule is a key, albeit informal, aspect of the 
item-by-item, request-and-offer method that has been GATT’s most common form of 
negotiation over the years.
7  It basically mandates that a country’s tariff on each product 
be negotiated with the exporters having a “principal supplying interest” in the country’s 
market for that product. Normally this is taken to mean the largest exporter, or group of 
exporters, as measured by market share.
8  W e  s h o w  t h a t  s u c h  a  r u l e  i s  a n  o p t i m a l  
response to the MFN free rider problem.  In a situation where full participation is not 
possible, it is beneficial to have the countries that do participate be principal suppliers as 
this minimizes the MFN externality, thereby producing the lowest negotiated tariffs. Note 
that this principal supplier rule emerges from the optimality of the mechanism rather than 
being imposed from the start.   
In Section III.D we bring together the above results to derive a relationship 
between the HHI of export market shares and the tariff implemented by the optimal 
mechanism.  General comparative statics are elusive, because the tariff depends on the 
entire distribution of market shares. However, if any two distributions can be ranked 
according to first-order stochastic dominance, the one with the higher HHI also produces 
                                                 
7 In the Uruguay round, the US used the item-by-item approach. On the other hand, the Kennedy and 
Tokyo Rounds were characterized by a formula approach, whereby each country cuts tariffs across-the-
board according to a certain formula agreed to at the outset. In fact, however, countries deviated 
considerably from the formula cuts on an item-by-item basis, and many countries ignored the formula 
entirely (Hoda, 2001, pp. 30-32). Negotiations over these deviations took place on an item-by-item basis 
between principal suppliers. According to Hoda (2001, p. 47), “Thus a linear or formula approach did not 
obviate the need for bilateral negotiations: they only gave the participants an additional tool to employ in 
the bargaining process.” 
8 This rule is not clearly spelled out in the GATT agreement, except in the case of renegotiation. According 
to Article XXIII, when a country wishes to modify or withdraw a concession previously granted, it must 
negotiate compensation with, 1) those countries with which the concession was originally negotiated, and 
2) those countries with a principal supplying interest, defined as having market share larger than any 
country in category 1) or as otherwise determined by the Ministerial Conference (Hoda, 2001, p. 14). Thus, 
Article XXIII implies that the country granting the original concession becomes liable to compensate 
principal suppliers for modifications or withdraw.    8
the lower tariff.  Section III.E extends the model to include exogenous preferential trade 
agreements. 
In Section IV, we empirically assess the importance of the free rider problem for 
U.S. tariffs.  Using a panel of US MFN tariff rates at the 4-digit ISIC level from 1989-
1999, we find a strong negative correlation between tariffs and the HHI measure of 
exporter concentration that is quite consistent over time.  This relationship survives the 
inclusion of variables that proxy for domestic political-economy determinants of trade 
barriers.  We also estimate a complete Goldberg-Maggi type model for 1983 with the 
same result (e.g., Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000).  In 
particular, estimates using 1983 U.S. tariff levels show a significant and negative impact 
of exporter concentration.  Estimates using U.S. non-tariff barriers do not. Considering 
that many non-tariff barriers are exempt from MFN, we take this as evidence of an MFN-
related free rider problem in tariffs. Section V concludes. 
 
III. The Model   
There are N + 1 countries, indexed by i = 0,…, N, and two goods, X and Y, 
produced under constant returns to scale and perfect competition.
9 Good Y is the 
numeraire and employs only labor, while X employs both labor and a sector-specific 
factor K, according to the production function  X = g(K,L).  Preferences are identical 
across countries, according to the quasi-linear per capita utility function, U = cY + u(cX), 
where  ′  u > 0,  ′  ′  u  < 0. The endowments of country i are given by Ki and Li, and let 
                                                 
9 For simplicity, we consider X to be a single good, though the model could be extended to make X a vector 
of goods without weakening the results.     9
ki ≡ Ki /Li. We assume endowments are such that country 0 is the natural importer of 
good X and the other N countries are natural exporters. 
Each government seeks to maximize a weighted welfare function, with weight λ 
reflecting the greater importance of specific-factor owners in its domestic political 
process.  Letting S denote per capita consumer surplus, π the return to the specific factor, 
and M net imports, the government welfare functions are given by,  
  w0 = L0 1+ S(p)+ (1+ λ0)π(p)k0 [] + (p− p
∗)M0(p) (1) 
  wi = Li[1+ S(p
*)+(1+ λi)π(p
*)ki]  for  i =1,...,N (2) 
The domestic and foreign prices are p and  p
∗, respectively.   
Although not essential for our results, it is convenient for exposition to impose a 
degree of symmetry on the exporters.  Let ki = k
∗ and λi = λ
∗ for all i = 1,…, N.  This 
enables us to write (2) as wi =θiw
∗, where w
∗ = Σ j=1
N w j and θi = Li /Σ j=1
N L j.  We refer to 
θi as the export market share of exporter i, as it equals i’s share of world exports of 
product X to the importing country. Thus, an exporter’s welfare is proportional to its 
market share and market shares are independent of world price.
10 
The importer imposes an ad valorem tariff on good X. All countries are assumed 
to be members of the WTO and are therefore entitled to MFN treatment. Thus, the 
importer must charge a single, uniform tariff on all imports of X, regardless of the 
                                                 
10 Without the symmetry assumptions, it would still be the case that the change in an exporter’s welfare is 
proportional to θi, i.e.,  ′  w  i =θiw
∗′, which is the important point.  However, θi would differ from simple 
market share, becoming θi ≡ (−Mi + λiXi)/Σ j∈N(−M j + λ jX j), and would vary with the world price.  None 
our theoretical results would change, as long as the price elasticity of θi is not too large.  In our empirical 
work, we use simple market shares as a proxy for θi, since we lack data on the political weights of the 
exporting countries.  Thus, there is ultimately no benefit to using the more general, more complicated, 
specification.   10
source.
11  To compensate the importer for reductions in its tariff, the exporters must offer 
concessions in exchange.  We allow these concessions to take the form of transfers of 
good  Y.  The assumption that exporters use transfers, as opposed to reciprocal tariff 
reductions on other goods, simplifies the analysis in two ways.  First, it allows us to 
abstract from the efficiency consequences of the exporters’ policies.  While this is a very 
convenient property, it is not necessary for our results.  Second, it means that the MFN 
externality associated with X is neither suppressed nor magnified by reciprocity.  In 
actual practice, countries typically exchange trade barrier reductions of various kinds, 
some presumably suppressing the externality and others magnifying it. What is important 
for our theory is that on balance there be a positive MFN externality.  Transfers ensure 
this without the complication of explicitly modeling these effects.  
To determine the tariff and transfers, we need a model of multilateral trade 
negotiations.  One approach is to construct a bargaining game embodying the multitude 
of rules found in actual WTO negotiations.  Given the complexity of actual WTO 
negotiations, however, this is a monumental task, not mention a risky one, considering 
the sensitivity to specification displayed in previous literature.   The approach we take 
here is based on mechanism design theory.  We begin by positing a hypothetical center, 
or principal, which we refer to simply as the WTO.  The WTO’s objective is to maximize 
the joint welfare of its members.  It does this by designing a game, or mechanism, 
through which the members interact. The mechanism has a general form: Γ = 
{Σ0,Σ1,...,ΣN,τ(⋅),t(⋅)}, where Σi is the action space of country i, τ :Σ0 ×...× ΣN →ℜ is 
a tariff function, and t :Σ0 ×...×ΣN →ℜ
N is a transfer function.  Each country chooses 
                                                 
11 At this point, we abstract from preferential trade agreements as permitted under Article XXIV.  These are 
dealt with in section IIIE.   11
an (pure) action σi ∈Σ i.  The functions τ(⋅) and t(⋅) map the resulting action profile 
σ = (σ0,σ1,...,σN) into a tariff τ, measured as one plus the ad valorem tariff rate, and a 
transfer profile t = (t1,t2,...,tN), respectively.  A mechanism Γ is said to implement the 
outcome (˜  τ ,˜  t ) ∈ℜ
N+1 if there exists a Nash equilibrium σ of Γ such that τ(σ) = ˜  τ  and 
t(σ) = ˜  t .  
With no restrictions on the set of mechanisms, the WTO could always implement 
a fully efficient outcome by simply choosing τ(⋅) to equal the unconstrained world 
optimal tariff for all action profiles. However, we shall restrict attention to mechanisms 
satisfying the following two conditions: 
 
(V) Voluntary Participation: each country may withdraw from negotiations. If exporter i 
withdraws, then ti = 0, regardless of the others’ actions, while if the importer withdraws, 
then ti = 0 for all i and τ is set at its unilaterally optimal level τ . 
 
(P) Pareto Efficiency for Participants: for all σ, τ(σ) maximizes the joint welfare of all 
countries that do not withdraw. 
 
The first assumption is that no country can be forced from its status quo.  The exporters 
cannot be forced to make positive transfers, and the importer cannot be forced to reduce 
its tariff.  This assumption can be justified by appealing to national sovereignty.  The 
second assumption is that participants will always negotiate an efficient outcome for 
themselves.  Importantly, this means that the participants cannot be made to take part in 
any scheme to punish free riders with an inefficient (for participants) tariff. One possible   12
justification for this might be renegotiation: if participants were permitted to renegotiate 
the tariff-transfer package after the fact, then no inefficient agreement would survive.  In 
light of these restrictions, we can reduce the action space to two actions, withdraw and 
not withdraw (i.e., participate), without loss of generality. 
An example of a class of games satisfying V and P are the voluntary participation 
games of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1982), Saijo and Yamato (1999) and Dixit and Olson 
(2000).  While these authors study the provision of public goods, the application to our 
context is immediate. They posit a two-stage process, where, in the first stage, agents 
decide non-cooperatively whether or not to participate.  Participants are assumed to share 
the cost of providing the public good, according to some sharing rule, while non-
participants pay nothing (V). In the second stage, participants engage in efficient 
bargaining over the level of the public good (P).  It can be shown that any outcome that is 
implementable under V and P is an equilibrium of a voluntary participation game for 
some sharing rule.  In this paper, we endogenize the sharing rule (i.e., the transfer 
function), by way of the optimal mechanism, and we are unique in considering 
heterogeneous agents.  
 
A. The Efficient Tariff 
In this section, we solve for the efficient tariff for any set of participants, 
including the importing country. Let N refer to the set of all exporting countries (as well 
as number of countries in N), and consider the set  A ⊆ N.  Assuming the importing 
country and all members of A participate, we can find the efficient tariff by maximizing 
w0(τ)+Σ i∈Awi(τ) with respect to τ.  The first-order condition is,   13
  ′  w  0 + ′  w  i
i∈A
∑ = 0 (3)   
Defining ∆≡− ′  ′  w  0 +Σ i∈A ′  ′  w  i []
−1, the second-order condition is ∆ > 0.  
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where  µ and ξ
∗ are the elasticities of import demand and total export supply, 
respectively.  Combining this relationship with (3), (4) and (5) produces an expression for 
















































τ  (6)   
This expression can be seen as a generalization of the equilibrium tariffs found in 
Grossman and Helpman (1995).  In their two-country framework, N = 1, so the only 
possible values for ΘA are zero and one.  When ΘA = 0, we obtain the unilateral tariff,   

























τ τ . (7) 
If we let λ0 =
IL −αL
a+αL
, where IL is an indicator of the political organization of the sector-
specific factor, αL is the fraction of voters represented by a lobby, and a is the   14
government’s preference for social welfare relative to lobbying contributions, then (7) is 
identical to the “trade war” equilibrium of Grossman and Helpman (1995).  Similarly, 


























⎟ ,   (8) 
which is the same as Grossman and Helpman’s “trade talks” equilibrium.
12 
  The efficient tariff declines as countries are added to the set of participants.  This 
is confirmed by noting that the addition of a country to A increases ΘA, and by total 
differentiation of (3), dτ
e /dΘA = w
∗′∆ <0.  This is driven by the terms-of-trade effect of 
the tariff.  The more the terms-of-trade cost of the tariff falls on the participating 
exporters, as opposed to free riders, the more the total welfare cost of the tariff is 
internalized in the tariff setting exercise. As the cost to any exporter is proportional to its 
market share, the share of the total cost that falls on participating exporters is ΘA.  Thus, 
the larger is the cumulative market share of the participating exporters the less beneficial 
is a tariff to the participant group and the smaller is the efficient tariff.  
 
B. Voluntary Participation 
Having found the efficient tariff for any given set of participants, we consider 
next the question of which countries choose to participate.  Suppose A is an equilibrium 
set of participating exporters.  For country i to be a member of this set, the net benefit it 
receives from participation must exceed the payoff it would receive by withdrawing, 
given the behavior of all other countries.  This means that the transfer i pays must satisfy, 
                                                 
12 In addition, if there is no domestic political pressure (λ0 = λ
* = 0), the efficient tariff in (7) is equal to 
the optimum tariff for a large open economy, while the efficient tariff in (8) is equal to 1 (free trade).   15
  ti ≤ wi(τ
e(A))− wi(τ
e(A \i)). (9) 
The right-hand side of (9) is the loss in gross welfare exporter i would experience by 
withdrawing from A.  This loss is due to an increase in the efficient tariff from τ
e(A) to 
τ
e(A \i) resulting from i’s withdrawal.  We can think of the right-hand side of (9) as the 
amount exporter i would be willing to pay to participate.   
If i's market share is fairly small, the right-hand side of (9) can be approximated 
by its differential θi
2(w
∗′)
2∆, evaluated at τ
e(A).  Thus, an exporter’s willingness to pay 
is proportional to its squared market share.  This is because a country’s welfare loss from 
a small increase in the tariff is proportional to its market share, and so is its impact on the 
efficient tariff.  
To ensure the participation of the importing country, the sum total of the transfers 




∑ ≥ w0(τ ), (10) 
Combining (9) and (10), we find that there exists a profile of transfers that supports A as 
an equilibrium set of participants, if and only if, 




∑ − w0(τ )− w0(τ
e(A)) [ ]≥ 0 (11) 
The function Ω(A) measures the difference between the total willingness to pay of the 
participating exporters and the opportunity cost to the importing country of imposing the 
efficient tariff instead of its unilateral tariff.  It follows that a tariff τ can be implemented 
if and only if τ = τ
e(A) and Ω(A) ≥ 0 for some  A ⊂ N.  
There are two questions about implementation we can answer immediately.  First, 
is it possible to implement a tariff less than τ ?  That is, can the WTO induce at least   16
some participation?  The answer is, yes, as can be seen by noting that for any single 
exporter i, Ω(i) = wi(τ
e(i))+ w0(τ
e(i))−(wi(τ )+ w0(τ )).  As τ
e(i) maximizes wi + w0 by 
definition, it must be that Ω(i) ≥ 0.  As this is true for any exporter, including the largest 
one, we conclude that the minimum implementable tariff is at least as low as the efficient 
tariff for the importer and the largest exporter.   
Second, is it possible to implement the unconstrained world optimal tariff τ
w?  
That is, can the WTO induce full participation? The answer turns out to depend on the 
degree of exporter concentration as measured by the HHI, or H ≡ Σi∈Nθi
2.  The range of 
H is from 1 (the largest exporter controls the entire market) to 1/N  (each exporter has 
equal market share).  In the case of H = 1, we have already seen that participation of the 
largest exporter is an equilibrium. Thus τ
w can be implemented.  As H declines, however, 
this becomes less likely.  To see this, note that if market shares are fairly small, our 
earlier approximation of the willingness to pay implies:  






∑ − w0(τ )− w0(τ
e(A)) [ ] (12) 
Evaluating (12) at A = N, we have, Ω(N) ≈ H[w
∗′(τ
w)]
2∆ −[w0(τ )− w0(τ




2∆ and [w0(τ )− w0(τ
w)] are positive and invariant to H, Ω(N) decreases 
as  H decreases. In the extreme case of H = 1/N,  Ω(N) becomes negative (and the 
approximation becomes exact) as N gets large. Thus, full participation is not an 
equilibrium, and τ
w cannot be implemented. We summarize these conclusions in the 
following proposition:  
 
Proposition 1: τ
w can be implemented if and only if the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
exporter concentration is sufficiently high.   17
 
C. Optimal Mechanisms and the Principal Supplier Rule 
We defined an optimal mechanism to be one that maximizes world welfare, 
subject to V and P.  This is equivalent to finding a set of countries A that minimizes 
τ
e(A), subject to Ω(A) ≥ 0.  We know from Proposition 1 that A = N solves this problem, 
if H is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the problem is more difficult.  Because the domain 
(the power set of N) is discrete, we face a potentially intractable nonlinear integer 
programming problem. In this section, we show that this problem can be simplified 
considerably, with minimal loss of generality, by restricting attention to sets of 
participants obeying the principal supplier rule, defined as follows: 
 
Definition:  A set of participants A obeys the principal supplier rule (PSR), if and only if 
there exists a critical exporter  ′  i ∈ A such that θi ≥θ ′  i  for all i ∈ A, and θi ≤θ ′  i  for all 
i ∉ A.  
 
In other words, under the principal supplier rule, only the exporters above a certain size 
participate. The two extreme cases discussed in the previous section, that of participation 
by the single largest exporter and that of full participation (A = N), both satisfy this rule.   
The virtue of the principal supplier rule can be seen by comparing any two sets A 
and B, that are equivalent in the sense that ΘA = ΘB, but where B obeys PSR while A does 
not.  Because they have the same cumulative market share, these two sets produce the 
same efficient tariff.   However, it can be shown (see proof of the next proposition) that 
Ω(B) ≥ Ω(A).  Thus, any non-PSR set having an equivalent PSR set can be thrown out of 
consideration in our search for an optimal mechanism.    18
The reason Ω(B) ≥ Ω(A) is evident from (12).  Total willingness to pay is an 
increasing function of the sum of the squared market shares of participants. For any given 
cumulative market share, the sum of the squared market shares is maximized by choosing 
the largest exporters.  Intuitively, a small group of large exporters has a greater total 
willingness to pay than a large group of small exporters (even though they have the same 
cumulative market share), because each of the large exporters has larger impact on the 
tariff than any of the small exporters. 
Can we eliminate all non-PSR sets from consideration? No, because not all non-
PSR sets have an equivalent PSR set.  This too is a consequence of the discreteness of the 
countries.  If there were many exporters each with small market share, this problem 
would evaporate.  Nevertheless, for any non-PSR set A having no equivalent PSR set, 
there is a PSR set C that is slightly smaller (ΘC < ΘA) and another PSR set D, obtained by 
adding the next largest country to C, that is slightly larger (ΘD > ΘA). We can show that 
Ω(C) ≥ Ω(A), provided a mild regularity condition holds.
13  If as well, Ω(D) ≥ Ω(A), then 
we can throw out A. Otherwise, it is possible that A is part of an optimal mechanism.  
Even in this case, however, PSR sets are useful, as C and D provide bounds for locating 
the tariff implemented by this mechanism.  Moreover, with small market shares, the gap 
between C and D is small, so there is minimal loss of generality by focusing exclusively 
on PSR sets.  
As the focus of our empirical work is on tariffs, it is useful to express the above 
results in terms of tariffs instead of sets of participants.  To that end, we define: 
•  A tariff τ is feasible under PSR, if there exists a PSR set A such that τ
e(A) = τ.   
                                                 
13 We assume [Ω(A∪i)−Ω(A)]/θi is non-decreasing in θi. This “convexity” property always holds for 
small enough θi, so the assumption here is that convexity extends to discrete changes as well.   19
•  Let ˆ  A  be the largest PSR set satisfying Ω( ˆ  A  ) ≥ 0.  Thus,  ˆ  τ = τ
e( ˆ  A  ) is the smallest 
tariff implementable under PSR.  
•  Let  ˆ  A 
+ be the next largest PSR set, with  ˆ  τ 
+ =τ
e( ˆ  A 
+).  The set  ˆ  A 
+ is obtained by 
ˆ  A ∪ˆ  i 
+, where ˆ  i 
+ is the largest exporter not a member of  ˆ  A .   
We can now state a precise relationship between optimal mechanisms and the principal 
supplier rule.  
 
Proposition 2: Let  ˜  τ  be the tariff implemented by the optimal mechanism, and let  ˆ  τ  be 
the smallest tariff implementable under PSR.  If  ˜  τ  is feasible under PSR, then  ˜  τ = ˆ  τ .  
Otherwise, ˜  τ ∈ (ˆ  τ 
+,ˆ  τ ], and  ˜  τ → ˆ  τ  as θˆ  i 
+ →0.  
 
Proposition 2 states that the smallest tariff implementable under PSR is either optimal or 
nearly so, and it establishes an upper bound on the error. The smaller is the market share 
of the largest non-participant the smaller the error.  In the limit the error is zero.    
There are three reasons to appreciate Proposition 2.  First, it greatly simplifies the 
search for optimal mechanisms.  To find the largest PSR set satisfying Ω≥0, one simply 
adds countries to the set of participants in rank order until the constraint binds.  To go the 
extra mile of finding  ˜  τ , one need only search for sets with efficient tariffs between  ˆ  τ  and 
ˆ  τ 
+ and check if they satisfy Ω≥0.  Second, as we shall see in the next section, the 
simplicity afforded by focusing on PSR sets allows us to obtain comparative statics on  ˆ  τ .  
Proposition 2 tells us that results concerning  ˆ  τ  should carry over to  ˜  τ  with only a small 
amount of potential error.  We rely on this fact for our empirical estimation.  Finally, as a 
theoretical result on its own, the optimality (or near-optimality) of PSR sets helps to 
rationalize the principal supplier rule itself.  A protocol under which negotiations take   20
place on given product only if the principal suppliers participate is actually part of an 
optimal response to the MFN free rider problem.
14 
 
D.  The Effect of Exporter Concentration with Many Exporters  
In this section, we explore the relationship between the optimal mechanism and 
the underlying distribution of market shares.  To facilitate this, we assume a large number 
of exporters, each with relatively small market share, and in view of Proposition 2, we 
restrict attention to mechanisms satisfying the principal supplier rule.  It is convenient to 
order our exporters with z = 1,…, N, where z is the rank of each country, in terms of 
                                                 
14 One might question whether all of this machinery is necessary to generate the result that countries 
participate in negotiations according to the principal supplier rule.  For example, couldn’t one generate the 
same pattern by simply assuming a fixed cost to participation? Our view is that a model based on fixed 
costs is neither simpler nor more powerful than the one we have presented.  If we continue to assume 
voluntary participation (which seems necessary for any theory of endogenous participation) and Pareto 
efficiency for participants (which is necessary for connecting the market share of participants to the tariff), 
then any potential simplification of our model must come from dropping the assumption that the 
mechanism determining transfers among participants is chosen optimally.  Retaining the optimal 
mechanism assumption and simply adding fixed costs would only add complexity and would be pointless, 
as we already generate the principal supplier result without it.  Dropping the optimal mechanism requires us 
to replace it with an alternative, non-optimal mechanism (fixed costs notwithstanding), which would 
require justification. Moreover, assumptions would be needed about both the relative magnitude and the 
cross-country distribution of fixed costs, whereas we have no empirical evidence about either one.  Thus, a 
model based on fixed costs is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate the principal supplier rule and 
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market share. Let  f (z) be the market share of z, which is a monotonically declining 
function, and let F(x) =Σ z=1
x f (z) be the cumulative market share of the top x exporters.   
An outcome (x, τ) satisfying conditions V, P and PSR solves the system, 
  ′  w  0(τ)+ F(x)w
∗′(τ) = 0 (13) 
  h(x)w
∗′(τ)
2∆ ≥ w  0 −w0(τ) (14) 
where  h(x) =Σ z=1
x f (z)
2 is the HHI of participants.   This is illustrated in Figure 2.  The 
curve P shows the efficient tariff for each x, as determined by equation (13).  The shaded 
area above and including V shows all values of x and τ satisfying (14).  Every outcome on 
the arc OU can be implemented.  The optimal mechanism implements point O, which is 
the outcome with the lowest tariff. 
15    
Inspection of (14) makes it clear the participants’ willingness to pay for the tariff 
depends on the degree of market concentration of participants as measured byh(x). To 
                                                 
15If (14) holds with equality, the importer’s payoff isw0(τ ), which represents no gain relative to the status 
quo. Each free rider gains by θi[w
*(ˆ  τ )−w
*(τ )], i ∉ A, from improved market access. Each participating 
exporter gains by θi[w
*(τ
e( ˆ  A /i))−w
*(τ )], i ∈ A.  Relative to market share, this is less than the gain to 
free riders, because participants must compensate the importer for its terms of trade loss.  
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Figure 3a: The effect of an increase in 
concentration, holding Θ constant at A. 









Figure 3b: The effect of an increase in 
concentration, according to FSD.   22
see how concentration matters, consider an initial density f0, with a corresponding 
optimal outcome (ˆ  x  0,ˆ  τ  0), and suppose we replace f0 with a new density f1, such that 
F0(ˆ  x  0) = F 1(ˆ  x  0) but h0(ˆ  x  0) < h1(ˆ  x  0).  In other words, all else equal, the HHI of 
participants is higher under the new density.  What happens to the optimal outcome?  The 
answer can be seen in Figure 3a.  By construction, the P schedule does not shift in the 
neighborhood of point O.  Thus, the new density does not, by itself, change the efficient 
tariff.  However, under the new density, the total willingness to pay of participants is 
higher.  This is reflected by a downward shift in the V schedule at point O.  This means 
that total willingness to pay under f1 exceeds the cost of the initial tariff to the importer.  
This being the case, the optimal mechanism would call for an increase in participation 
and lower efficient tariff.  Thus, the larger the HHI of participants ceteris paribus the 
lower is the tariff.  This is summarized in the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 3:  Consider any two densities f0 and f1 with interior solutions (ˆ  x  0,ˆ  τ  0) and 
(ˆ  x  1,ˆ  τ  1), respectively, such that F0(ˆ  x  0) = F 1(ˆ  x  0).  If h0(ˆ  x  0) < h1(ˆ  x  0), then  ˆ  τ  0 > ˆ  τ  1.  
  
Proposition 3 establishes the connection between the HHI of participants and the 
tariff, holding all else constant.  The empirical usefulness of this proposition is limited, 
however, because we are not able to measure the HHI of participants, without knowing 
the critical exporter.  This is endogenous and usually unobservable (to the 
econometrician).  
There are two ways to proceed.  One is to impose some structure on the 
distribution of market shares that will enable us to establish a connection between the 
HHI of participants h(x) and the HHI of the whole market H.  It turns out that if two   23
distributions of market shares can be ranked according to first-order stochastic 
dominance (FSD), there is a tight connection indeed.  
 
Proposition 4: If f0 and  f1 are densities such that F0(x) > F 1(x) for all x, and both admit 
interior solutions, then the equilibrium market share of participants is higher, and the 
tariff is lower, under  f0 than under  f1.  Moreover, H0 > H1, i.e., the overall market 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index is higher under  f0 than under  f1. 
Proof in appendix. 
 
  Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 3b.  The P schedule shifts to the left, because 
under the new distribution, the cumulative market share is higher for all x, and thus the 
efficient tariff is lower for all x.  The V schedule shifts down because, for all x the HHI of 
participants is now higher, meaning that the willingness-to-pay threshold for each τ is 
reached for a smaller x.  The proof of the proposition shows that the shift in V is greater 
than the shift in P, and thus the new equilibrium O′ is left of O.  
As an example of Proposition 4, assume that market shares have a geometric 
density, f (z) = q(1−q)
z−1 for 0 < q < 1 (this density assumes a countably infinite number 
of countries).  In this case, the HHI of any set of participants becomes,  
  h(x) = H 1−(1− F(x))
2 [ ] (15) 
where H = q
2 /[1−(1−q)
2].  It is easy to see from (15) that for any given F(x) (which 
determines the tariff), an increase in H increases h(x), which relaxes the participation 
constraint.  
   24
Corollary:  If market shares are distributed geometrically, then any increase in the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of the whole market increases the market share of 
participants and decreases the tariff.  
 
The second way to proceed would be to assume parametric forms for the 
fundamentals of the underlying economy.  This would enable us to solve for the optimal 
set of participants, given any distribution of market shares, and thereby deduce the 
corresponding cumulative market share of participants and efficient tariff.   We have 
done this for the special case of Leontief technology and linear demand; however, since it 
does not contribute to our empirical analysis, it is not included here.  Details can be found 
in our working paper (Ludema and Mayda, 2005).  
 
E.  Free Trade Agreements 
Before moving ahead to the empirics, there is one extension of the model that is 
necessary to make it applicable to a real-world setting: we need to account for 
preferential trade agreements.  We do not consider the endogenous formation of PTAs, 
because we believe such decisions involve factors well outside the scope of this paper.  
For the most part, the introduction of exogenous PTAs requires little change in our model 
beyond reinterpretation.  For example, if two or more of the exporters are members of a 
customs union (CU), we treat them as a single exporter, and if an exporter is part of a CU 
with the importer, we treat the pair as the importer.  The interesting case is when the 
importer and an exporter (henceforth, the “partner”) form a free trade area (FTA). In this   25
case, the partner’s incentives differ from those of the other exporters: the partner prefers a 
higher tariff to be imposed on the other exporters.   
We assume that the partner does not participate directly in the negotiations but 
allow for the possibility that the importer takes into account the effect of its tariff on the 
partner.
16 Also, to simplify, suppose λ
∗ = 0.  Thus, the objective of the importer is, 
 
w0 + φwFTA = L0 1+ S(p)+ (1+ λ0)π(p)k0 [] + (p− p*)ER(p*)
+φLFTA 1+ S(p)+ π(p)kFTA []
  
where  wFTA is the welfare of the partner, φ measures the importer’s concern for the 
partner, and  ER denotes total exports of those countries that are not members of the FTA. 





















where ΘFTA refers to the partner’s share of the total home imports, and ΘAR refers to the 
market share of non-FTA participants as a fraction of  ER.  All of our previous results 
concerning the effects of concentration on the tariff are unchanged; however, here they 
apply to the HHI of non-FTA countries only.  Moreover, note that the tariff is increasing 
in φ and decreasing in the partner’s market share, for φ < 1. 
 
 
                                                 
16 This might be justified by assuming the importer and FTA partner engage in ongoing bilateral 
negotiations over non-trade policies, as in Limão (2002).  In such a model, increases in partner welfare due 
to increases in the importer’s external tariff are partially extracted by the importer through negotiations, 
with φ reflecting the importer’s bargaining share. This would suggest that φ lies between 0 and 1. However, 
if the external tariff also affects the threat point of the negotiations, as is assumed by Limão, then φ could in 
effect exceed 1.     26
IV. Empirical strategy and results 
In this section we empirically analyze the impact of MFN-related free-riding on 
MFN tariff rates. Our analysis focuses on the United States and is based on two data sets: 
the first one is a panel covering the years between 1989 and 1999; the second data set 
only includes information for the year 1983, but on a greater number of variables than the 
first one. 
Here is our plan of attack. We first show that a preliminary examination of the 
data, in both periods, produces evidence consistent with the predictions of the model: a 
higher sector concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index over export 
market shares, is associated with lower U.S. MFN tariff rates. However, these are only 
correlation patterns. We next worry about identification issues. We address them using 
an empirical specification which is closely related to the model predictions. In particular, 
our theoretical results point out that both domestic political-economy factors and MFN-
related free riding affect MFN tariff rates. We need to control for the first set of variables, 
as they might be correlated with sector concentration and give rise to an omitted variable 
bias. Using the first data set, we account for domestic political-economy factors 
indirectly, by controlling for the inverse import-penetration ratio and allowing its 
coefficient to vary by industry.
17 When we use the second data set, which focuses on a 
single year (1983), we have access to a larger number of variables, for example political 
contributions by sector. This allows us to control directly for domestic political-economy 
factors. 
                                                 
17 Industries are defined at a higher level of aggregation (3-digit ISIC codes) than sectors (4-digit ISIC 
codes). We use the terms sectors, products and goods interchangeably throughout this section: they all refer 
to 4-digit ISIC codes.   27
To apply the theoretical model to the data, we assume that the tariff on each 
product k is the outcome of an independent negotiation.  While it is fairly standard to 
assume a separable utility function, so as to obtain independence across optimal tariffs, 
our assumption also requires that countries make their participation decisions on a good-
by-good basis.  A second assumption is λ
∗ = 0, i.e., exporting governments care only 
about welfare.  Given that the U.S. has FTA partners during the sample period, the 
relevant equation for the efficient tariff is (16).  This equals 1 (free trade) if there is full 
participation, no domestic political pressure and negligible FTA share. Taking a first-
order Taylor approximation of (16) around this point, and adding an error term, we obtain 
the following estimating equation: 
  τk −1=
1
ξk








ΘFTA,k +εk. (17) 
The variables we directly observe in the data are, τ k −1,  Xk /Mk, and ΘFTA,k, which 
measure, respectively, the MFN tariff rate, the inverse import-penetration ratio, and 
imports from FTA partners as a share of total imports, in sector k. In addition, the 1983 
dataset contains estimates of the elasticity of import demand
18 µk and domestic political 
contributions, which affect ILk, the latter being the variable component of the Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) term, λk = (ILk −αL)/(a+αL).  We lack data on all other variables 
and thus treat them as parameters to be estimated. 
To estimate the MFN free-rider effect, the key variable is ΘAR,k, which measures 
U.S. imports from participants in GATT/WTO negotiations with the U.S. over product k 
as a fraction of U.S. imports from all countries that are entitled to MFN treatment and are 
                                                 
18 Note that the import demand elasticity µk appears in equation (17) instead of the FTA-augmented 
elasticity found in (16). This is because our approximation occurs around the point of zero FTA share, 
where the two elasticities are the same.      28
not U.S. FTA partners. Although we know the market share of each exporting country, 
we do not observe which countries participate in the negotiations over which good.   
Dealing with this problem was the ultimate purpose of Propositions 1 and 4.  They tell us 
that we should focus on H, the HHI for the entire market.  Proposition 1 says that ΘAR,k< 
1 if H is low enough, and ΘAR,k= 1 if it is high enough.  Moreover, if the conditions of 
Theorem 4 are met, ΘAR,k is a monotonically increasing function of H. 
Thus, the main prediction of the model is that, controlling for domestic political-
economy determinants and FTA market share, the MFN tariff rate is negatively affected 
by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  We measure the index as,  




Mik i∈MFN ∑ ()
2  (18) 
where MFN is the set of all non-FTA countries that export product k to the U.S. and are 
granted MFN treatment by the U.S., while GATT is the subset of MFN consisting of 
members of the GATT/WTO (and are therefore potential participants in the multilateral 
negotiations).  Mik is the value of U.S. imports of product k from country i. Thus the HHI 
so defined equals the sum of squared shares of exports to the U.S. over all potential (non-
FTA) participants. 
 
A.  Results 1989 - 1999  
Our first set of results is based on data for the years between 1989 and 1999 
(excluding 1994, for which tariff data is not available in our data set). The period of time 
covered by the panel includes the final years of the Uruguay round – which took place in 
1986-1994 – and its implementation period.  We use the World Bank's Trade and   29
Production Database
19 (Nicita and Olarreaga 2001), which includes data on applied MFN 
tariffs,
20 multilateral and bilateral trade flows and production for 81 manufacturing 
industries at the 4-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC 
Rev. 2).
21 We obtain information on GATT/WTO membership from Rose (2004) and on 
MFN treatment from the U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule.
22 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the 1989-1999 
analysis. The U.S. MFN tariff rate is characterized by a downward trend over the period, 
decreasing by 1.75 percentage points between 1989 and 1999.
23  Coinciding with this is a 
steady decline in the inverse import-penetration ratio. The HHI shows no clear pattern, 
except for an upward jump that occurs in 1995.  The FTA share increases over the period 
and also jumps up in 1995. FTA countries include Israel and Canada for the whole period 
                                                 
19 The advantage of the World Bank data set is that it provides data across countries – according to the 
same international classification – which we use to construct instruments for the U.S. HHI index. The 
disadvantage is that the level of disaggregation is not very high. Additional results based on data classified 
according to the 4-digit U.S. SIC classification and the 8-digit Harmonized System classification are, 
respectively, presented and discussed at the end of this section. 
20 We use applied MFN tariff rates as opposed to bound rates. In practice, the difference between the two 
sets of tariff rates in the U.S. data is quite small.  While our theoretical model makes no distinction between 
the two, Bagwell and Staiger (2005) provide a theory that accounts for the difference, based on private 
information about political pressure.  In their model, the bound rate is chosen to ensure the incentive 
compatibility of applied rates, whereas applied rates maximize the expected welfare of the negotiating 
parties.  Accordingly, the applied rate is the more appropriate measure of our efficient tariff.  
21 This dataset derives from several sources: the UNCTAD Trains, UN Comtrade, and UNIDO Industrial 
Statistics databases are the sources of MFN tariffs, trade flows and production data, respectively. Tariffs 
are MFN simple averages at the 4 digit level of the ISIC classification. 
22 From 1996 onwards, the only non-MFN countries were Afghanistan, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Iran, 
Vietnam, Serbia and Montenegro. Before then, the US granted unconditional MFN to all countries, except 
Communist countries. Communist countries began receiving MFN treatment in the nineties. 
23 The MFN tariff rate continues to decline over time after the end of the Uruguay round (this is true even at 
the 8-digit level of the Harmonized System classification). There are a few explanations for this pattern. As 
discussed in footnote 20, these are applied rates (the tariffs importers actually pay) rather than bound rates 
(the tariff ceilings countries agree to in international negotiations). While bound rates remain fixed between 
negotiating rounds, applied rates can and do vary from year to year.  Countries have discretion over applied 
tariffs below bound rates. The other major source of intertemporal variation in applied rates is the transition 
from one set of bound rates to another, in the years following the conclusion of a round (the Uruguay 
Round phase-in period was 1995-1999). In addition, countries exercise some discretion in whether tariff 
reductions negotiated in a round are implemented on schedule.  Finally, another source of tariff changes are 
renegotiations that occur between rounds, as allowed by Article XXVIII, but these are not common.   30
(1989-1999), and Mexico from 1994.
24 Thus, the jumps are most likely due to Mexico 
being removed from the HHI and added to the FTA share after 1994, as removal of a 
country near the middle of the market share distribution generally increases the HHI. 
A first pass through the data shows that, in 1993, the U.S. MFN tariff rate is 
indeed negatively related to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  This result is robust to 
changes in the year considered, as shown in Table 2, where we regress the U.S. MFN 
tariff rate on the HHI, year by year.
25 We estimate a negative and significant coefficient 
on HHI for each year between 1989 and 1999.  Given the importance of the European 
Community (EC) as a trading partner of the U.S., we check the robustness of our results 
to two alternatives. We first consider each European country separately (results not 
shown), while in Table 2 we think of the EC as constituting one negotiating block.
26 The 
two sets of results are consistent with each other and with the theoretical predictions. 
Interestingly, the estimates in the regressions where European countries are considered 
separately are larger in absolute value.
27 
In Table 2 the estimated effect of the HHI index drops (in absolute value) after the 
end of the Uruguay round.  In addition, for the same years, when we regress the MFN 
                                                 
24 We use the strict definition of Article XXIV to determine FTA status.  Countries that may have received 
preferential treatment through other means, such as the Generalized System of Preferences, are treated as 
MFN non-FTA countries.  We take this approach mainly because of the inconsistent coverage and 
conditional nature of these preferences. 
25 All our regressions (Tables 2 to 7) use robust standard errors to address heteroskedasticity. In Table 4 we 
also clustered standard errors by industry to account for correlation in the error term introduced by the 2-
stage estimation procedure. Outliers (observations with tariffs higher than 50) are excluded from the 
analysis in Tables 2 to 5. 
26 When we consider the European-Community (EC) countries as one block, we take into account when 
each country joined the EC (date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Netherlands 
(1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom 
(1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986) were part of the EC in 1989; Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden joined it in 1995; Turkey joined it in 1996. 
27 One explanation of this result is that a related free-rider problem arises within the EC, as well. Therefore 
concentration of export market shares within the EC affects the EC's willingness to participate in 
multilateral negotiations over a product and to pay for a US tariff reduction.   31
tariff rate on both the contemporaneous HHI index and the 1993 HHI index, we estimate 
a negative and significant coefficient on the latter variable and an insignificant coefficient 
on the former variable (results not shown). These results are consistent with our model, as 
the free-riding effect of the MFN clause is likely to be strongest at the time of multilateral 
negotiations.
28 In light of all this, in our preferred specifications (Tables 3, 4 and 5) we 
focus on the end of the Uruguay round and estimate the impact of the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman index in 1993 on the average MFN tariff rates over the following years (1995-
1999). 
In Table 3, we first introduce covariates that capture the effect of domestic 
political-economy determinants. Such factors have been analyzed both theoretically and 
empirically in the previous literature (Grossman and Helpman 1994, 1995; Goldberg and 
Maggi 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000) and their importance emerges in our 
model as well, as pointed out above. Due to lack of data on the degree of political 
organization (which affects  k λ ) and on import-demand elasticities by sector  k µ , we 
employ industry dummy variables to proxy for them. In addition to domestic political-
economy determinants, we also control for the FTA market share. Our main specification 
looks as follows: 
  τ95−99,k −1=α + β ⋅ H93,k + ηl ⋅ Il
X93,k
M93,k l
∑ +ν ⋅ΘFTA  93,k +εk, (19) 
where  τ95−99,k −1 is the average ad-valorem U.S. MFN tariff rate over the years 1995-
1999,  X93,k M93,k  is the inverse import-penetration ratio in 1993 (ratio of domestic total 
                                                 
28 The free-riding effect of the MFN clause is likely to be strongest at the time of multilateral negotiations 
because, at that time, any shock to the HHI can affect the contemporaneous MFN tariff rate. If negotiators 
are forward-looking, after the end of the round, shocks to the HHI which are anticipated at the time of 
negotiations can affect the contemporaneous MFN tariff rate. This is not the case for unanticipated shocks 
(unless renegotiations take place).   32
output to imports), ΘFTA  93,k is FTA countries' share of U.S. imports in 1993,  k is the 4-
digit ISIC code and l is the 3-digit ISIC code. The dummy variables corresponding to the 
3-digit ISIC codes (Il) capture the impact of each industry's political organization and 
import demand elasticity, which are assumed to be constant over time.
29 
Once we account for domestic political-economy determinants, our result does 
not change. Controlling for the interaction of the inverse import-penetration ratio with 
industry fixed effects, the correlation between the U.S. MFN tariff rate and the HHI is 
still negative and significant (at the 1% level). The estimate is even higher than without 
such controls (compare regressions (1) and (2), Table 3). According to column (2), a 10 
percentage points increase in the HHI decreases the MFN tariff rate by 0.7 percentage 
points. We use the estimates from this specification to calculate the average – across 
sectors – percentage difference between the MFN tariff rate corresponding to the actual 
value of the HHI in each sector and the tariff rate corresponding to an HHI of 1. We find 
that this average percentage difference equals 96% in 1993, i.e. absent free-riding due to 
the MFN clause tariff rates would be very close to zero.
30 
From (17) we expect the FTA market share to have a negative effect on the MFN 
tariff rate. The intuition behind this result is that, the larger the export market share of 
FTA partners, the smaller the terms-of-trade gain for the U.S. from setting a high tariff 
(as the price of goods coming from FTA partners equals the domestic price) and, 
therefore, the lower the MFN tariff rate. We find evidence consistent with this prediction 
                                                 
29 We use industry dummy variables rather than sector ones otherwise there would be no variation left to 
identify the impact of exporter concentration on MFN tariff rates. Notice, however, that other studies 
analyzing domestic political-economy determinants of tariffs also run the analysis of such factors at the 3-
digit level (Goldberg and Maggi 1999, for example). 
30 Strictly speaking, the HHI does not have to equal 1 for no free riding at all to take place (it could be 
smaller than 1). Therefore our calculation might overstate the impact of MFN-related free riding.   33
in regression (3) where the coefficient on the FTA share variable is estimated to be 
negative and significant (at the 10% level). Notice that, while the FTA share variable is 
likely to be endogenous due to reverse causality, this should bias the estimate of the 
coefficient towards zero, as higher MFN tariff rates should increase import shares from 
FTA partner countries. 
The remaining specifications in Table 3 further test the robustness of our findings.  
First, our theory assumes that exporting countries reciprocate with transfers, while in 
practice countries exchange trade barrier concessions of various kinds.  In such a world, it 
could be that the U.S. is more inclined to swap concessions with countries that represent 
a large market for U.S. exports (e.g., EU).  One might be concerned that the goods 
principally supplied by such countries have high Hk, thus causing a negative correlation 
between  Hk and τk unrelated to MFN.  To address this issue, in column (4) we control 
for the share of U.S. total exports to the top five exporters of each good. This variable 
represents a measure of U.S. export dependence on the principal suppliers of each good 
the U.S. imports.
31  It turns out to have no effect on the coefficient of Hk. 
Second, our theory focuses on the participation decisions of GATT/WTO 
countries. Non-GATT countries receiving MFN (e.g., China) are included in the 
denominator of  k H , 93 , because they enjoy the MFN externality (the terms-of-trade 
improvement from a reduction in the U.S. tariff) but are excluded from the numerator, 
because they are not potential participants. Therefore, the higher the non-GATT market 
share the lower our measure of the HHI. In regression (5) we add the non-GATT market 
                                                 
31 Bown (2004) uses essentially the same measure. He finds that the greater a country’s export dependence 
on the principal suppliers of a given product, as measured by the share of its worldwide exports (of all 
products) sold to those suppliers, the less likely it is to implement protection (safeguards and safeguard-like 
measures) on that product.   34
share as a control to check whether it drives the estimate on the HHI.
32 It turns out to 
have no effect on the results at all.
33 
Third, up to now we have addressed the potential endogeneity of exporter 
concentration by strictly following the theoretical model, namely by controlling for the 
other determinants of tariffs in equation (17).  However, it is possible that other domestic 
political-economy determinants of U.S. MFN tariff rates, not captured in the theoretical 
model, are correlated with the HHI.  To deal with this possibility, we estimate the model 
using Canada’s HHI as an instrument for the U.S. HHI (regressions (6)-(7)): Canada’s 
exporter concentration is correlated with that of the U.S.
34 but is unlikely to be correlated 
with U.S.-specific political-economy dynamics. Another concern is reverse causality: a 
higher tariff rate may affect the exporting countries' market shares and thereby influence 
the HHI. This cannot occur in our theoretical model, which assumed export market shares 
independent of the world price, but it might be true in the data if the elasticities of export 
supply differ across countries. Even then, for differences in elasticities to explain the 
negative relationship between the tariff and the HHI, they would have to vary by market 
share systematically: countries with larger market share would have to reduce exports in 
response to higher tariffs proportionally more than do countries with smaller market 
share. To address this possibility, we instrument the U.S. HHI with the variable RankHI: 
this variable is equal to the U.S. HHI constructed using, as import shares, the predicted 
values from a gravity model with, as regressors, per capita GDP, population, distance and 
the rank of each country in world exports of each product (regressions (8)-(9)).   The 
                                                 
32 The bias induced by the non-GATT market share could go either way, according to whether bilateral 
negotiations take place between the U.S. and non-GATT MFN countries. 
33 This is true whether we include the non-GATT market share separately, include it in the numerator of Hk, 
or exclude it entirely.  
34 The correlation coefficient between the U.S. HHI and the Canadian one is 0.81.   35
implicit assumption is that country ranks in world exports are not systematically affected 
by U.S. tariffs. The results from instrumental-variable regressions seem to confirm our 
previous results on the effect of exporter concentration. 
In Tables 2 and 3, the negative relationship between the MFN tariff rate and the 
HHI is estimated exploiting the cross-sectional variation in the two variables. On the 
other hand, the time variation in the data set is helpful to control for domestic political-
economy determinants of MFN tariff rates, which are likely to change substantially year 
after year. We next estimate the model using a two-stage estimation procedure that allows 
us to account for both the ongoing effects of political pressure and the once-off effect of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, between 1995 and 1999 (see footnotes 23 and 28). The 
regressions in Table 4 represent the second stage of this procedure. In the first stage the 
US MFN tariff rate is regressed on 4-digit sector-specific fixed effects and the interaction 
of industry dummy variables with the contemporaneous inverse import-penetration ratio 
(for the years between 1995 and 1999). In the second stage, the 4-digit sector-specific 
fixed effects are regressed on the 1993 HHI and the interaction of industry dummy 
variables with the average inverse import-penetration ratio in 1995-1999. Thus the 
dependent variable of the second stage represents time-invariant differences in MFN 
tariff rates across sectors, in 1995-1999, after netting out the impact of domestic political-
economy determinants over time in the same period (see Appendix for details about the 
two-stage estimation procedure). 
Weighted-least-squares (WLS) are employed in regressions (2)-(6), Table 4. 
Weights are constructed using the variance of the sector fixed effects from the first stage.   36
WLS puts more weight on sectors with smaller variance of the estimated fixed effect.
35 
Results from Table 4 are remarkably similar to our previous finding, in particular in 
terms of the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on sector concentration. 
Finally, one of the limitations of the World Bank data set is its relatively high 
level of aggregation – only 78 observations at the 4-digit level of ISIC.  We therefore 
check the robustness of our results using more disaggregated data, specifically at the 8-
digit Harmonized System level (7670 observations) and at the 4-digit SIC (1987) level 
(386 observations), the latter being the least aggregated data for which there are matching 
U.S. production data.
36 Although not shown, cross-sectional regressions at the 8-digit HS 
level confirm a negative and significant correlation of the average U.S. MFN tariff rate 
(1995-1999) with the 1993 HHI.
37 The results at the 4-digit SIC (1987) level are 
presented in Table 5 (see also Figure 4) and confirm all of our previous estimates.  The 
main difference from Table 3 is that the coefficient estimates on FTA Share and Share of 
US exports to top 5 exporters are now negative (as expected) and significant at the 1% 
level.  
 
B.  Results 1983  
We next focus on 1983 for which we have information on a range of additional 
variables. In particular we can use direct information on sectors' political organization 
                                                 
35 We use the same estimation strategy as in the labor-economics literature on industry wage structure (for 
example, Pavcnik and Goldberg 2003). 
36 MFN tariff rates and import data at the 8-digit HS level come from, respectively, John Romalis' and 
Robert Feenstra's websites. Production data at the 4-digit SIC (1987) level come from Peter Schott's 
website.  
37 This is robust to controlling for both 4-digit codes fixed effects and 6-digit codes fixed effects (which 
capture domestic political-economy determinants). Details are available upon request from the authors.    37
status and import-demand elasticities (which were kindly provided by Gawande). We 
estimate the following model:  












+εtk   (20) 
where (τk −1) is the U.S. post-Tokyo round ad-valorem tariff and POk is a political-
organization dummy for sector k, classified according to the 4-digit U.S. Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC, 1972-based).
38  Notice that, as in the previous literature, 
we break down the parameter λk in formula (18) into two components, according to 
whether the sector is politically organized or not.
39 Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of 
this specification. We find that the relationship between the U.S. MFN tariff rate and the 
HHI is still negative, once we control directly for domestic political-economy 
determinants. This result is robust to using different measures of political organization (as 
in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000, or as in Goldberg and Maggi, 1999)
40 and to the 
inclusion of additional regressors (the direct effect of Political Organization; and tariffs 
and NTB on intermediate goods).
41 
In Table 7, we follow Goldberg and Maggi (1999) in treating the import demand 
elasticity, the political-organization measure and the inverse import-penetration ratio as 
econometrically endogenous. We move the import demand elasticity to the left-hand 
                                                 
38 The remaining variables are defined as above but refer to the year 1983. See Appendix 1 for a list of the 
variables used in the 1983 analysis, summary statistics and data sources. 
39 In other words, λk = γ +δ⋅ POk, with γ =−αL /(a+αL) <0, δ =1/(a+αL) > 0 and γ +δ >0. 
40 We use two different measures of Political organization. GB Political Organization is the same variable 
used in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), who consider as politically-organized those sectors where 
import penetration (from major partners) significantly explains the size of political contributions (see p.145 
in Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000 for details). We construct GM Political Organization as in Goldberg 
and Maggi (1999), using information from their Table B1 (p.1153). 
41 Regressions (2) and (4) in Table 7 provide information on the relative importance of political-economy 
determinants vs. free-riding. The difference between the two R
2 measures (equal to 0.07) is the variance of 
tariffs, left unexplained by the political-economy determinants, which is explained by free-riding (Greene, 
1997).   38
side
42  and we use the same variables as in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) to construct 
instruments for POk and  Xk Mk  (using data kindly provided by Trefler). In particular, 
we model the inverse import-penetration ratio as in cross-commodity regressions
43 of 
trade flows, i.e. as a function of sector factor shares. As instruments for the political-
organization dummy, we use variables employed in the political-economy literature as 
determinants of endogenous protection (Trefler 1993).
44 Following Goldberg and Maggi 
1999), we use both sets of instruments for both variables. The list of instruments used is 
in Data Appendix 1. 
As already pointed out, endogeneity of export concentration is an issue in the 
estimation of the impact of free riding.
45 Endogeneity of the HHI per se is not the only 
problem. While our estimates may be indicative of a causal negative impact of exporters' 
concentration on MFN tariff rates, the channel through which the effect is working may 
not be free riding. For example, a higher concentration of exporters in the U.S. market of 
product k may increase the incentive of those few foreign exporters to get organized and 
lobby directly the U.S. government or their own government (high λ
*) for lower 
                                                 
42 Notice that, when we move the import demand elasticity to the left-hand side, the coefficient on the 







43 The term "cross-commodity regression" we borrow from Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, p. 1368). In 
cross-commodity regressions, trade flows by sector are regressed on sector factor intensities. The 
coefficients on factor intensities are expected to be consistent with the country's relative factor 
endowments, as predicted in the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  This is not inconsistent with our model, which is 
based on a sector-specific framework, because the Heckscher-Ohlin model can be thought of as a long-run 
version of the sector-specific model, where in the long-run all factors are perfectly mobile within the 
economy (Trefler 1993). 
44 Notice that, for the political-organization dummy, in the first stage we specify a linear reduced-form 
equation. On the other hand, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) use a probit model. 
45 Examples of possible omitted variable biases are the following. The HHI of export shares is likely to be 
positively correlated with a measure of domestic (firm) concentration in the importing country. Since 
higher domestic firm concentration in the importing country positively affects whether the sector is 
politically organized at home (λ), which implies a higher level of protection (Bombardini 2005), our 
coefficient estimate on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is biased towards zero through this channel, which 
reinforces our results.  In a similar vein, strategic trade policy considerations would suggest tariffs should 
be higher in sectors where firm concentration is high both at home and abroad. Again this reinforces our 
results.  We thank Ralph Winter and Jim Brander for pointing this out.     39
protection. In that case, we would observe a lower tariff rate on that good, but it wouldn't 
be due to free riding. In order to investigate these issues, we next estimate a model of 
U.S. nontariff barriers (NTBs). We focus on the same regressors we used to analyze 
MFN tariff rates. 
It is reasonable to assume that tariff rates and NTBs share many common 
determinants.  That the two forms of protection are affected by the same domestic 
political-economy factors was established by Ray (1981) and can be seen by comparing 
our results with those of Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000), which focus only on NTBs.  Foreign lobbying is also likely to affect tariff and 
NTBs in a similar manner.  The main difference is that NTBs have historically been less 
subject to GATT/WTO discipline than have tariffs.  Indeed, previous empirical work on 
endogenous protection has tended to focus on NTBs precisely because NTBs are thought 
to better represent noncooperative policy behavior than tariffs. Furthermore, although 
broadly subject to GATT Article I, NTBs in practice constitute one of the most common 
departures from nondiscrimination.
46  In theory, whether they are set noncooperatively or 
whether they are set cooperatively but in a discriminatory manner, NTBs should not 
suffer from the MFN free rider problem.
47 Thus, loosely speaking, NTBs represent a 
counterfactual of the level of protection of MFN tariff rates, absent the effect of free 
riding through the most-favored nation clause.  According to this argument, we would not 
                                                 
46 NTBs include anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, country-specific quotas, VERs and a host of 
other discriminatory policies. Jackson notes that: "Quantitative restrictions often pose an important 
conceptual challenge to the MFN principle... In a similar context, the explosion of the use of export-
restraint arrangements in world trade provided one of the most significant recent challenges to the MFN 
principle of GATT." (p. 164, 1997) 
47 One might worry that the availability of NTBs would undermine the MFN free rider effect for the tariff 
of the same sector as well.  From a theoretical point of view, this is generally not the case, unless NTBs and 
tariffs are perfect substitutes. From an empirical point of view, our evidence does not support this 
hypothesis.    40
expect a regression of NTBs on exporter concentration to yield the negative and 
significant result we found for tariffs.
48   
Figures 5 and 6 offer evidence consistent with this intuition. Using the 1983 data, 
the correlation between the HHI and the MFN tariff rate is negative (as it was in 1989-
1999), while NTBs appear to be positively related to exporter concentration. Column (4) 
in Table 7 confirms this result using regression analysis (IV estimation). The impact of 
exporter concentration on NTBs is positive and insignificant, using the same instruments 
as in regression (3) for, respectively, the inverse import penetration ratio and the political 
organization dummy.
49 
To conclude, we believe we found evidence that the negative relationship between 
sector concentration and MFN tariff rates is indeed related to the effect of free riding due 
to the most-favored-nation clause. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The theory presented in this paper makes basically two assertions.  The first is 
that there should be a negative relationship between the tariff in an industry and the 
market share of the countries participating in negotiations over that tariff.  The intuition is 
that the larger is this share, the greater is the share of the benefit from tariff reduction that 
is internalized by the negotiators.  This is the most basic aspect of the MFN free-rider 
                                                 
48 It is possible the MFN free rider problem could indirectly affect NTBs.  For example, if one follows 
Copeland (1990) in treating NTBs as non-negotiable and set after tariffs are negotiated, then the NTB 
should be a function of the tariff, which according to our theory, is subject to the MFN free rider problem.  
This suggests that we should include the tariff as an explanatory variable in our NTB regression, as in Ray 
(1981) and Trefler (1993) (whereas Goldberg and Maggi (1999) do not include the tariff).  In fact, we find 
that HHI has no significant effect on NTBs, whether the tariff is included as an explanatory variable or not.  
49 As in the previous literature (Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000), domestic 
political-economy determinants affect NTBs as predicted by Grossman and Helpman's (1994) model, 
though the significance level of the estimates depends on the particular specification used.   41
problem.  The second assertion is that the market share of participants increases with the 
degree of concentration of the exporters in the industry.  This stems from the fact that our 
optimal mechanism assigns participants according to a principal supplier rule.  Together 
these assertions produce a negative relationship between the tariff and the degree of 
concentration, which we find to be quite robust in the data.  
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Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 2: 
 
Suppose  ˜  τ  is feasible under PSR, and let B be the PSR set such that  ˜  τ =τ
e(B).  For B 
to be an equilibrium set of participants, we need that,  
 
  wi(˜  τ )− wi(τ
e(B \i))
i∈B
∑ ≥ wi(˜  τ )− wi(τ
e( ˜  A \i))
i∈ ˜  A 
∑  
or   44
  θi ′  w (τ)dτ




∑ ≥ θi ′  w (τ)dτ
˜  τ 
τ
e( ˜  A \i) ∫
i∈ ˜  A 
∑  
The left-hand side of this inequality can be written as, 
 
  θi ′  w (τ)dτ +Θ B ′  w (τ)dτ
˜  τ 
τ
e(B\ ˆ  i ) ∫ τ
e(B\ ˆ  i )
τ
e(B\i) ∫
i∈B\ ˆ  i 
∑ , 
while the right-hand side is strictly less than,  
  θi ′  w (τ)dτ
τ
e(B\ ˆ  i )
τ
e( ˜  A \i) ∫
i∋θi >θ ˆ  i 
∑ +Θ ˜  A  ′  w (τ)dτ
˜  τ 
τ
e(B\ ˆ  i ) ∫ .   
This last point follows from fact that  ˜  A  must contain elements with smaller market share 
than that of the critical exporter in B.  Now given that ΘB =Θ ˜  A  by definition, a sufficient 
condition for B to be an equilibrium set is,  
   
  θi ′  w (τ)dτ ≥ θi ′  w (τ)dτ
τ
e(B\ ˆ  i )
τ
e( ˜  A \i) ∫
i∋θ i >θ ˆ  i 
∑
τ
e(B\ ˆ  i )
τ
e(B\i) ∫
i∈B\ ˆ  i 
∑  
This must hold, because B contains all exporters such that θi >θˆ  i , while ˜  A  does not.  
Now considering that B is a PSR equilibrium set, and  ˆ  τ  is the minimum implementable 
PSR tariff, it must be that  ˜  τ = τ
e(B) ≥ ˆ  τ .  But if  ˜  τ > ˆ  τ , then  ˜  τ  is not the minimum 
implementable tariff, which is a contradiction.  Hence, ˜  τ = ˆ  τ .  
 
If ˜  τ  is not feasible under PSR, then it must lie strictly between two PSR tariffs. Let C and 
D denote, respectively, the largest and smallest PSR sets such that τ
e(C) > ˜  τ > τ
e(D).  
Now consider a hypothetical country k such that θk = Θ ˜  A −ΘC. It is straightforward that  
Ω( ˜  A  )−Ω(C) <Ω (C∪k)−Ω(C).  Convexity implies,  
 
  Ω(C∪k)−Ω(C) [] θˆ  i  D ≤ Ω(D)−Ω(C) [ ]θk  
or  
  Ω( ˜  A  ) <Ω (C∪k) ≤(θk /θˆ  i  D)Ω(D)+(1−θk /θˆ  i  D)Ω(C) 
 
By definition Ω( ˜  A  ) ≥0, Ω(D) <0 and 0 <θk /θˆ  i  D <1.  Thus, Ω(C) >0.  But this means 
that C = ˆ  A  and D = ˆ  A 
+, so  ˆ  τ > ˜  τ > ˆ  τ 
+.  Finally,  ˜  τ → ˆ  τ  follows from the fact that  ˆ  τ 
+ → ˆ  τ  
as θˆ  i 
+ →0.   QED 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
 
Let  ˆ  x  0 be optimal value of x under  f0, and suppose there exists  ′  x  such that 
F 1( ′  x ) = F0(ˆ  x  0).  If we can show that  ˆ  x  1 < ′  x , then we will have proven that the 
equilibrium market share of participants is higher, and the tariff is lower, under  f0 than 
under  f1.  We show  ˆ  x  1 < ′  x  by establishing that at  ′  x  the participation constraint (14) is 
violated.  Since the efficient tariff is at ′  x  under  f1 is the same as at  ˆ  x  0 under  f0 by 
construction, we need only show that, h1( ′  x ) < h0(ˆ  x  0).  This condition can be written as,   45
  h1(ˆ  x  0)+ f1(z)
2
ˆ  x  0
′  x 
∑ < h0(ˆ  x  0) 
We can write,  
  f1(z)
2
ˆ  x  0
′  x 
∑ ≤ f1(ˆ  x  0) f1(z)
ˆ  x  0
′  x 
∑  
which follows from the fact that f1 is decreasing (as we have ordered the countries in 
descending order of market share).  Similarly, F 1( ′  x ) = F0(ˆ  x  0) can be written as, 
F 1(ˆ  x  0)+ f1(z)
ˆ  x  0






ˆ  x  0
∑ − f1(ˆ  x  0)[F0(ˆ  x  0)−F 1(ˆ  x  0)]>0 







ˆ  x  0
∑ − f1(ˆ  x  0)[F0(ˆ  x  0)− F 1(ˆ  x  0)]
= f0(ˆ  x  0)[F0(ˆ  x  0)− F 1(ˆ  x  0)]+ [f0(z)+ f1(z)− f0(z+1) − f1(z+1)]
z=1
ˆ  x  0−1
∑ [F0(z)− F 1(z)]> 0
 
    
which must hold, because f1 and f0 are decreasing in z, and F0(z)− F 1(z) > 0 for all z.  
The final part of the Proposition 4 is that H0 > H1.  This follows from the same 
decomposition we used above, namely,  
 
 
H0 − H1 = f0(N)+ f1(N) [] [F0(N)− F 1(N)]
+ [ f0(z)+ f1(z)− f0(z+1) − f1(z+1)]
z=1
N−1
∑ [F0(z)− F 1(z)]> 0
  




In Table 4 we estimate the model using a two-stage estimation procedure which 
allows us to account for the impact of domestic political-economy determinants over time 
between 1995 and 1999. We are interested in estimating the model: 
δk =α + β ⋅ H93,k + γl ⋅ Il
X9599,k
M9599,k l
∑ +εk,   εk ~ N(0,σ
2) 
where  X9599,k /M9599,k is the average inverse import-penetration ratio in 1995-1999 (recall 
that k is the 4-digit ISIC code, while l is the 3-digit ISIC code). δk is a time-invariant 
component of the MFN tariff rate for each sector k over the period 1995-1999 after 
netting out the within variation of domestic political-economy determinants over the 
same period. Consider the following procedure:   46
first stage: τtk −1= δk
k
∑ ⋅ Ik + ηl ⋅ Il
Xtk
Mtk l
∑ + vtk, vtk ~ N(0,1), t ≥1995 
where  Xtk /Mtk is the inverse import-penetration ratio at year t. Since δk is unobserved, 
we use the estimated coefficients  ˆ  δ  k =δk +ηk from the first stage in the following second 
stage regression: 
second stage:  ˆ  δ  k =α + β ⋅ H93,k + γl ⋅ Il
X9599,k
M9599,k l
∑ +εk +ηk,   ηk ~ N(0,σ k
2) 
In this regression, σk is the standard error of the  ˆ  δ  k from the first stage. We assume that 
ε  and η are uncorrelated. 
In the above two-stage model, the dependent variable of the second stage ( ˆ  δ  k) is a 
generated regressand based on the first stage. Generated regressands are analogous to 
dependent variables with measurement error, as they cannot be directly observed. 
Assuming the measurement error in the dependent variable (η) is statistically 
independent of the explanatory variables (H93,k and  X9599,k /M9599,k), the OLS estimators 
of the coefficients ( ˆ  α 
OLS, ˆ  β 
OLS,  ˆ  γ  l
OLS) are consistent. However, the disturbance variance 
(σ
2 +σ k
2) is higher than if we could observe the dependent variable without error (σ
2). It 
is also not constant across observations, since the standard error varies across delta hats: 
thus the second-stage regression is characterized by heteroskedasticity (Greene, 1997, 
Ch.12; Wooldridge, 2002, Ch.4). Further, the specification of the first-stage regression 
implies that the  ˆ  δ  k are, by construction, correlated within each 3-digit ISIC code. Thus 
the second stage is characterized by both heteroskedasticity and correlation in the error 
term. 
One way to deal with this is to account for a general form of heteroskedasticity and 
correlation in the error term of the second stage by computing robust (Huber-White) 
standard errors clustered by 3-digit ISIC product code (regression (1), Table 4). 
An alternative is to make use of the information available from the first stage, that is 
the standard errors of the delta hats. In regressions (2)-(5), Table 4, we employ weighted 
least squares (WLS) using as weights the square root of the inverse of (one plus) the 
variance of the delta hats from the first stage. (We still cluster standard errors by 3-digit 
ISIC product code to address correlation in the error term.) WLS puts more weight on 
sectors with smaller variance of the estimated fixed effect (Goldberg and Pavcnik 
2003).
50 
The reason for these weights is as follows.  Given the form of heteroskedasticity 
assumed in our two-stage model, the ideal weight is  κ
2 /(σ
2 +σk
2), where κ is any 
constant. Given such weights, the variance of the error term in the weighted version of 
the second-stage regression model is constant across observations and equal to κ
2 (we 
can therefore use OLS to estimate the weighted regression model):  
Var (εk +ηk) κ
2 /(σ
2 +σk







Since we lack an estimate of σ, in regressions (2)-(5), Table 4, we set σ=1. We also tested 
the robustness of our results using as weights  1/(n +σk
2), for different values of n ≥1. 
                                                 
50 We also apply Feenstra and Hanson's (1999) procedure but estimate a negative value for σ
2. year N mean sd min max
1989 US MFN tariff rate 78 5.2345 3.0526 0.0000 14.2400
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2289 0.1537 0.0054 0.8867
inverse import penetration ratio 75 18.7852 29.7961 0.6439 155.2061
FTA share 78 0.1714 0.1687 0.0001 0.8220
1990 US MFN tariff rate 78 5.2331 3.0517 0.0000 14.2000
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2311 0.1523 0.0042 0.8733
inverse import penetration ratio 75 18.1935 27.5926 0.5613 132.3461
FTA share 78 0.1773 0.1742 0.0021 0.8313
1991 US MFN tariff rate 78 5.2290 3.0449 0.0000 14.2000
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2245 0.1506 0.0060 0.8464
inverse import penetration ratio 75 17.8491 26.2337 0.5155 123.7547
FTA share 78 0.1857 0.1756 0.0022 0.8398
1992 US MFN tariff rate 78 5.2279 3.0450 0.0000 14.2000
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2252 0.1551 0.0089 0.8300
inverse import penetration ratio 75 16.8394 24.2814 0.3310 107.2883
FTA share 78 0.1895 0.1735 0.0028 0.8263
1993 US MFN tariff rate 78 5.2290 3.0470 0.0000 14.2000
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2191 0.1538 0.0194 0.7911
inverse import penetration ratio 75 16.2299 23.2409 0.3020 103.9189
FTA share 78 0.1974 0.1774 0.0054 0.7993
1995 US MFN tariff rate 78 4.7909 2.9900 0.0000 13.8400
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2412 0.1701 0.0157 0.7774
inverse import penetration ratio 75 13.5984 18.6294 0.2690 78.6234
FTA share 78 0.2699 0.1807 0.0026 0.8003
1996 US MFN tariff rate 78 4.4891 2.9604 0.0000 13.4500
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2409 0.1693 0.0185 0.7208
inverse import penetration ratio 75 12.4548 15.5014 0.2700 61.3738
FTA share 78 0.2884 0.1848 0.0038 0.8250
1997 US MFN tariff rate 80 4.5218 3.6204 0.0100 22.9200
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 80 0.2525 0.1902 0.0078 0.8303
inverse import penetration ratio 77 11.9353 14.6745 0.2472 62.9745
FTA share 80 0.2930 0.1798 0.0041 0.8209
1998 US MFN tariff rate 78 3.8331 2.8837 0.0000 12.7800
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2310 0.1676 0.0072 0.6894
inverse import penetration ratio 75 11.5272 14.2693 0.2050 60.3533
FTA share 78 0.2951 0.1789 0.0047 0.8055
1999 US MFN tariff rate 78 3.4862 2.8742 0.0000 12.6700
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 78 0.2092 0.1540 0.0079 0.6864
inverse import penetration ratio 0 . . . .
FTA share 78 0.2956 0.1750 0.0138 0.8007
Total US MFN tariff rate 782 4.7269 3.1075 0.0000 22.9200
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 782 0.2304 0.1617 0.0042 0.8867
inverse import penetration ratio 677 15.2582 22.3108 0.2050 155.2061
FTA share 782 0.2365 0.1837 0.0001 0.8398
Table 1: Summary Statistics of variables from World Bank's Trade and Production Database (1989-1999)
Outliers (US MFN tariff rates higher than 50) are excluded. US MFN tariff rates (in percentage points) are simple averages 
at the 4 digit level ISIC. For each sector, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index equals the sum of squared import shares from 
each exporting country to the US. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated excluding countries which are part of a 
preferential trade agreement with the US - Israel and Canada since 1989, Mexico since 1994 - and excluding countries 
without MFN treatment. Countries which do not belong to the WTO but receive MFN treatment by the US (such as Russia 
(from 1992) and China) are included in the denominator of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, but not in the numerator. The 
inverse import penetration ratio equals the ratio of output value to imports in each sector. The FTA Share gives the overall 
import share (by sector) from countries which are part of a preferential trade agreement with the US (Israel and Canada 
since 1989, Mexico since 1994).1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
OLS
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -5.36 -5.76 -6.28 -6.17 -6.36 -4.72 -4.66 -4.25 -4.64 -4.64
2.07* 2.12** 2.09** 2.15** 2.18** 2.12* 2.11* 1.84* 1.99* 2.15*
Constant 6.46 6.56 6.64 6.62 6.62 5.93 5.61 5.6 4.9 4.46
0.64** 0.64** 0.63** 0.62** 0.62** 0.64** 0.64** 0.61** 0.61** 0.60**
Observations 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 80 78 78
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06
Source: World Bank's Trade and Production Database. Robust standard errors under each estimated coefficient.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
EC countries are considered as one block (taking into account when each country joined the EC – date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Netherlands 
(1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain 
(1986) were part of the EC in 1989; (Andorra joined it in 1991;) Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined it in 1995; Turkey joined it in 1996.
Dependent variable: US MFN tariff rate
Table 2: Free-riding and the US MFN tariff rates (EC treated as a negotiating block)
Outliers (US MFN tariff rates higher than 50) are excluded. The US MFN tariff rate is expressed in percentage points.
See definitions of variables at the end of Table 1.1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) -5.92 -7.45 -7.78 -7.47 -8.25 -7.4 -6.77 -7.59 -7.24
1.99** 2.71** 2.73** 2.70** 3.08* 3.51* 3.66+ 3.89+ 3.87+
FTA share (1993) -4.5 -4.46 -4.48
2.62+ 2.62+ 2.62+
Share of US exports to top 5 exporters (1993) 0.21
4.74
non-GATT market share (1993) -1.5
3.37
Constant 5.53 5.94 6.62 5.86 6.36 5.92 6.41 5.96 6.51
0.59** 1.08** 1.15** 2.18* 1.46** 1.18** 1.26** 1.26** 1.31**
inverse import penetration ratio (1993)*ISIC3 DV no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 78 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
R-squared 0.09 0.55 0.59 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.55 0.59
The instrument in regressions (6)-(7) is Canada's Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993). The instruments in regressions (8)-(9) are Canada's Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) 
and RankHI (1993), which is the U.S. Herfindahl-Hirschman index in 1993 constructed using, as import shares, the predicted values from a gravity model (with, as regressors, 
per capita GDP, population, distance and the rank of each country in world exports of each product).
EC countries are considered as one block (taking into account when each country joined the EC – date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Netherlands 
(1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986) 
were part of the EC in 1989; (Andorra joined it in 1991;) Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined it in 1995; Turkey joined it in 1996.
Table 3: The impact of free-riding on US MFN tariff rates, cross-sectional regressions (1995-1999)
Average US MFN tariff rate (1995-1999)
The Share of US exports to top 5 exporters is equal to the fraction of total US exports going to the principal suppliers of each product. 
The non-GATT market share is the export share of countries which receive MFN treatment but are not GATT/WTO members, as a fraction of total imports of countries which 
receive MFN treatment. See definitions of remaining variables at the end of Table 1.
Data Source: World Bank's Trade and Production Database. Robust standard errors under each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Outliers, that is US MFN tariff rates higher than 50, are dropped. The US MFN tariff rate is expressed in percentage points. 
Dependent variable1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable
Method OLS WLS WLS WLS WLS WLS
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) -7.01 -7.39 -7.96 -7.6 -7.41 -7.99
2.92* 3.54* 3.59* 3.37* 3.62+ 3.60*
FTA share (1993) -3.3
4.12
Share of US exports to Top 5 Exporters (1993) 1.54
7
non-GATT market share (1993) -1.04
3.31
Constant 6.05 5.94 5.93 6.49 5.38 6.25
1.22** 1.52** 1.53** 1.74** 3.59 1.73**
inverse import-penetration ratio (1995-1999)*ISIC3 yes yes no yes yes yes
inverse import-penetration ratio (1993)*ISIC3 no no yes no no no
Observations 75 75 75 75 75 75
R-squared 0.94 0.63 0.62 0.65 0.63 0.63
Data Source: World Bank's Trade and Production Database.
Standard errors, clustered by 3 digit ISIC code, are presented under each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
See definitions of remaining variables at the end of Table 1.
Regressions (1)-(6) represent the second stage of a two-stage estimation procedure. In the first stage the US MFN tariff rate is regresssed on 4-digit sector-specific fixed 
effects and the interaction of 3-digit sector dummy variables with the contemporaneous inverse import-penetration ratio (for the years between 1995 and 1999). In the second 
stage (regressions in this Table) the 4-digit sector-specific fixed effects are regressed on the 1993 Herfindhal index (plus other controls) and the interaction of 3-digit sector 
dummy variables with the inverse import-penetration ratio. Weighted-least-squares (WLS) are employed in regressions (2)-(5), using as weights the square root of the inverse 
of (one plus) the variance of the sector fixed effects from the first stage. WLS puts more weight on sectors with smaller variance of the estimated fixed effect.
EC countries are considered as one block (taking into account when each country joined the EC – date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Netherlands 
(1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986) 
were part of the EC in 1989; (Andorra joined it in 1991); Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined it in 1995; Turkey joined it in 1996.
Table 4: The impact of free-riding on US MFN tariff rates, two-stage procedure (1995-1999)
Outliers, that is US MFN tariff rates higher than 50, are dropped. The US MFN tariff rate is expressed in percentage points. 
US MFN tariff rate (1995-1999)
The Share of US exports to top 5 exporters is equal to the fraction of total US exports going to the principal suppliers of each product. The non-GATT market share is export 
share of countries which receive MFN treatment but are not GATT/WTO members, as a fraction of total imports of countries which receive MFN treatment.Table 5: The impact of free-riding on US MFN tariff rates, cross-sectional regressions at the 1987 SIC 4-digit level (1995-1999)
1 2 3 4 5
OLS
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (1993) -5.98 -4.67 -3.72 -3.42 -4.59
1.14** 1.38** 1.37** 1.33* 1.59**
FTA share (1993) -4.43
1.08**
Share of US exports to top 5 exporters (1993) -11.55
3.82**
non-GATT market share (1993) 0.13
2.08
Constant 6.23 5.79 6.56 9.55 5.75
0.40** 0.57** 0.65** 1.58** 0.83**
inverse import penetration ratio (1993)*SIC3 DV no yes yes yes yes
Observations 386 386 386 386 386
R-squared 0.08 0.6 0.63 0.64 0.6
Data source: See text. Robust standard errors under each estimated coefficient. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: average US MFN tariff rate (1995-1999)
EC countries are considered as one block (taking into account when each country joined the EC – date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Luxembourg (1958), 
Netherlands (1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), Italy (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal 
(1986), Spain (1986) were part of the EC in 1989; (Andorra joined it in 1991;) Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined it in 1995; Turkey joined it in 1996.
The non-GATT market share is the export share of countries which receive MFN treatment but are not GATT/WTO members, as a fraction of total imports of 
countries which receive MFN treatment. See definitions of remaining variables at the end of Table 1.
All the data is at the 1987 SIC 4-digit level. The US MFN tariff rate is expressed in percentage points. Outliers, that is US MFN tariff rates higher than 35, are 
dropped. The Share of US exports to top 5 exporters is equal to the fraction of total US exports going to the principal suppliers of each product. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -8.95 -8.46 -4.06 -8.68 -8.83 -7.52
1.59** 1.59** 1.14** 1.61** 1.59** 1.47**
(inverse import penetration ratio)/elasticity -97.6 -65.75 -70.72 -53.66 -42.04 -125.23 -85.48
28.78** 14.86** 28.30* 14.98** 19.46* 62.49* 21.38**
(inverse import penetration ratio)/elasticity* GB Political Organization 86.74 53.3 62.31 42.4 32.13 76.69
28.50** 14.85** 28.18* 14.86** 19.65 21.26**
(inverse import penetration ratio)/elasticity* GM Political Organization 115.89
62.29+
GB Political Organization 1.57
0.69*
intermediate goods' tariffs 1.06 1.02
0.11** 0.11**
intermediate goods' NTB -0.01 -0.02
0.02 0.02
Share of US exports to Top 5 Exporters (1993) -13.48
4.16**
Constant 8.83 6.67 0.44 8.86 1.82 7.81 8.95 14.91
0.64** 0.39** 0.63 0.65** 0.80* 0.63** 0.65** 2.16**
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242
R-squared 0.08 0.02 0.42 0.09 0.44 0.11 0.09 0.15
Data source: data from Gawande and Banyopadhyay (2000), Feenstra (1998) and Goldberg and Maggi (2000). Robust standard errors under each estimated coefficient
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The US post-Tokyo round ad valorem tariff is expressed in percentage points.
The Share of US exports to top 5 exporters is equal to the fraction of total US exports going to the principal suppliers of each product. 
Table 6: Free-riding and the US MFN tariff rates, controlling for domestic political-economy determinants (1983)
Dependent variable: US post-Tokyo round ad valorem tariff
The inverse import penetration ratio equals the gross output to import ratio. The elasticity equals the absolute value of the import demand elasticity (after correcting for measurement 
errors). The Political Organization variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is politically organized, 0 otherwise (GB stands for Gawande and Bandyopadhyay; GM stands 
for Goldberg and Maggi).
EC countries are considered as one block (taking into account when each joined the EC – date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Netherlands (1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), 
Italy (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), were part of the EC in 1983.1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable (US NTB)*elasticity
Method OLS OLS IV Tobit IV IV
Herfindahl-Hirschman index -15.12 -9.04 -9.02 19.44
2.82** 2.05** 2.38** 19.16
inverse import penetration ratio -105.17 -73.14 -142.99 -317.75 -154.6
35.50** 34.10* 117.8 120.61** 373.52
inverse import penetration ratio*GB Political Organization 91.85 63.25 126.35 296.38 63.36
35.13** 34.01+ 124.65 125.25* 418.54
Constant 10.28 14.2 11.45 11.65 10.89
0.67** 1.17** 0.96** 0.80** 5.38*
Observations 242 242 194 194 194
R-squared 0.02 0.1 0.06
The US post-Tokyo round ad valorem tariff is expressed in percentage points.
Instruments used in IV regressions (columns (3) and (4)): Seller concentration, Buyer concentration, Seller number of firms, Buyer number of firms, Scale, Capital Stock, 
Unionization, Geographic concentration, Tenure; Physical capital, Inventories, Engineers&scientists, White-collar, Skilled, Semi-skilled, Unskilled, Cropland, Pasture, Forest, Coal, 
Petroleum, Minerals.
Table 7: Free-riding and the US MFN tariff rates, controlling for domestic political-economy determinants (1983)
The inverse import penetration ratio equals the gross output to import ratio. The elasticity equals the absolute value of the import demand elasticity (after correcting for 
measurement errors). The Political Organization variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the industry is politically organized, 0 otherwise (GB stands for Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay).
EC countries are considered as one block (taking into account when each joined the EC – date in parentheses): Belgium (1958), Netherlands (1958), Germany (1958), France (1958), 
Italy (1958), Luxembourg (1958), Denmark (1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Cyprus (1973), Greece (1981), were part of the EC in 1983.
(US ad valorem tariff)*elasticity
Data source: data from Gawande and Banyopadhyay (2000), Feenstra (1998) and Trefler (1993). Robust standard errors under each estimated coefficient.
 + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%data source: see text.


































































































































































































































































































































































3999Figure 5. Correlation between US tariffs and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 1983 (regression (1), Table 6)



























































































































































































































































3999Figure 6. Correlation between US NTB and Herfindahl-Hirschman index, 1983
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3832 3851 3861 3911 3914 3915 3931 3942 3944 3949 3991 3993 3996 3999Variable N mean sd min max
US post-Tokyo round ad valorem tariff (in %) 242 6.4535 5.8833 0.0000 41.8770
Herfindahl-Hirschman index 242 0.2655 0.1883 0.0149 0.9936
Inverse import penetration ratio 242 0.0094 0.0482 0.0000 0.7042
Elasticity (import demand) 242 1.5027 0.3705 0.5491 2.1647
GB Political Organization 242 0.6818 0.4667 0.0000 1.0000
GM Political Organization 256 0.7539 0.4316 0.0000 1.0000
Intermediate goods' tariffs (in %) 242 6.1200 3.5848 1.1586 17.2340
Intermediate goods' NTB (in %) 242 22.9144 14.1702 2.2551 67.8470
NTBs (in %) 242 12.7523 24.3472 0.0000 100.0000
Variable N mean sd min max
Seller concentration 194 0.3934 0.1924 0.0600 0.9400
Buyer concentration 194 0.3723 0.0719 0.1475 0.5806
Seller number of firms 194 0.2710 0.3834 0.0015 2.3826
Buyer number of firms 194 0.7341 1.4279 0.0027 14.3340
Scale 194 0.0344 0.0701 0.0003 0.6978
Capital Stock 194 0.3800 0.2373 0.0698 1.5076
Unionization 194 0.3496 0.1346 0.0660 0.7540
Geographic concentration 194 0.6948 0.1440 0.3330 1.0184
Tenure 194 5.3624 1.4595 2.3000 12.7000
Variable N mean sd min max
Physical capital 194 0.1092 0.0344 0.0162 0.2849
Inventories 194 0.0316 0.0135 0.0077 0.1045
Engineers, scientists 194 0.0294 0.0208 0.0023 0.1397
White-collar 194 0.1509 0.0401 0.0257 0.2950
Skilled 194 0.0962 0.0390 0.0133 0.2085
Semi-skilled 194 0.1161 0.0397 0.0193 0.2525
Unskilled 194 0.0370 0.0269 0.0035 0.2190
Cropland 194 0.0194 0.0548 0.0002 0.4798
Pasture 194 0.0047 0.0135 0.0001 0.1335
Forest 194 0.0004 0.0017 0.0000 0.0204
Coal 194 0.0021 0.0025 0.0003 0.0234
Petroleum 194 0.0297 0.0359 0.0027 0.4586
Minerals 194 0.0009 0.0021 0.0001 0.0274
Data sources: Trefler (1993)
Data sources: Trefler (1993). Seller concentrationis the four-firm concentration ratio; Buyer concentration is the weighted average of 
the four-firm concentration ratios among buyers of an industry's output (consumers and downstream industries); Seller number of firms 
is the number of companies scaled by industry sales; Buyer number of firms is the weighted average of the number of firms among 
buyers of an industry's output, scaled by industry sales; Scale is Caves's (1976) minimum efficient plant size, defined as the percentage 
of industry sales supplied by the median plant; Capital Stock is the value of depreciable assets such as physical plant and machinery; 
Unionization is the percentage of workers unionized; Geographic concentration is the measure of the difference between population 
and industry production patterns across the 50 states; Tenure is the number of years the average worker in the industry has been with 
his or her current employer.
Data Appendix 1 - Summary Statistics of variables used in 1983 analysis
Data Appendix 1 (cont.) - Instrumental variables for Political Organization
Data Appendix 1 (cont.) - Instrumental variables for Inverse Import Penetration Ratio
Data sources: Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), Goldberg and Maggi (2000) (GM Political Organization), Feenstra (1998) 
(bilateral trade data to construct Herfindahl-Hirschman index)